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Indeed, such a choice renders more diﬃcult the updating of believes process regarding their
actual types. Unfortunately, this in turn leads them to perform less eﬀort, which comes at
the expense of economic eﬃciency. Hence, the career concerns we examine do not discipline
good managers. However, we show that employers can reduce managerial slack by resorting
to financial markets monitoring.
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1 Introduction
Overall, the creation of new businesses is essential to economic development. The perspective of
establishing his own enterprise in the future doubtlessly impacts a manager’s current behavior.
The present chapter focuses on the negative externalities this perspective has on his performance.
More specifically, we argue that a priori good managers may indulge in choosing risky projects
that induce them to perform suboptimal levels of eﬀort, which decreases the total value of the
firms they work in. Hence, career concerns do not always discipline managers. We emphasize
this dark side of firm creation and investigate the adequate reaction of employers.
Creating and running one’s own company is often recognized as being a personal goal that
many managers share. On top of the satisfaction that making most of the important decisions
gives, becoming an entrepreneur also increases one’s ego as it enhances social status. Moreover, it
allows formerly employees to appropriate a more important fraction of the surplus they contribute
to create. Finally, embracing an entrepreneur’s career also comes with private benefits such as
pet projects or perks. In this chapter, we consider that becoming an entrepreneur allows to
enjoy an extra revenue as compared to what the manager would earn within the company he is
currently serving as an employee.
However, the founders of companies that have just graduated are relatively seldom. They
often lack the reputation, the experience and/ or the cash resources that are necessary to establish
their own businesses. To capture this in the simplest way, we consider a two-periods model where
every manager works within a company during the first period while only managers who have a
good reputation and enough funds can undertake their own project during the second period.
Reputation on the labor market is principally based on the manager’s past activities. Thus,
there exists a high level of uncertainty regarding these abilities when managers begin their pro-
fessional life as neither themselves nor their employers know whether or not they are fit for the
positions they hold. Hence, we assume that at the beginning of the first period (today) infor-
mation is symmetric but incomplete about the managers’ skills: the market (and the managers)
forms a priori believes regarding their talents, taking into account their diplomas for example.
To further keep the model as simple as possible, we make the assumption that there exists two
types of managers only: good ones and bad ones.
However, as managers go on with their careers, both the market and themselves come to
learn information regarding their competencies. Thus, a priori believes are updated with respect
to available information. Accounting profits and stock prices represent two sources of hard
information. Naturally, managers will take actions in an attempt to influence the market’s
believes. To phrase it diﬀerently, managers have career concerns. Indeed, according to DeMarzo
and Duﬃe (1995), “Career concerns arise whenever the (internal or external) labor market uses
a worker’s current output to update the believes about the worker’s ability and then bases future
wages on these updated believes”. As in traditional models of career concerns, the labor market
anticipates theses actions in equilibrium and so draws the correct inference about ability from
the observed output.
Here, the accuracy of the information that arises depends on two private choices and can
be manipulated. On the one hand, managers have the opportunity to choose the informational
content of the accounting data, using hedging techniques, among others. In the model we con-
sider, managers decide to hedge or not against the idiosyncratic risk of the project. In other
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words, they can opt for a more or less risky version of the project they undertake. We suppose
this choice to be observable but not verifiable. This reflects that accounting standards (see De-
Marzo Duﬃe (1995) for more details) do not impose on those who run firms (i.e. managers) to
disclose their hedging decisions. However, inside owners have privileged information regarding
these hedging decisions: they observe the choices managers make but they are unable to write
contracts contingent on this soft information.
On the other hand, inside owners of companies can use stock prices to elicit information.
Indeed, rendering the stock more liquid enables a speculator that receives private information
to disguise his orders more easily so as to make money against uninformed liquidity traders1.
Thus, it enhances its incentives to gather private information on the firm, which allows to update
more eﬃciently believes regarding the managers’ abilities. In our framework, inside owners of
companies choose whether to stay private or to go public. A more accurate information regarding
manager’s characteristics is useful since it leads to a level of eﬀort that is nearer the first-best
level.
To sum up, the present chapter analyses how the perspective of creating a new business in
the future influences the current willingness of managers to let the market (and themselves) learn
information regarding their characteristics as well as the employers’ willingness to gather this
information.
It seems reasonable that a condition for managers to have the opportunity to create their own
firms is that the updated believes regarding their types are good enough, that is, they need to be
perceived as good managers at the end of the first period. In this context, we show that opting
for the risky version of the project prevents outside financiers from updating believes eﬃciently.
Thus, we identify two opposite behaviors depending on whether a manager is a priori good or
bad. On the one hand, a priori bad managers want the market to change its believes regarding
their types. Hence, we prove that, provided that the extra revenue is attractive enough, they
choose the less risky version of the project to facilitate the updating of believes process. On
the other hand, a priori good managers want the market to keep its a priori about their talents.
Therefore, we show that they are likely to opt for the risky version of the project so as to limit
the updating process. Consequently, were the accounting data the only source of information,
a priori good managers would perform a lower level of eﬀort than a priori bad managers. This
would decrease the total value of the firm. However, in equilibrium, inside owners of companies
anticipate such behaviors. Thus, stock prices help improve the accuracy of information regarding
actual managerial talent so as to incentivize a priori good managers to exert a higher level of
eﬀort than they would otherwise perform. We show that inside owners of companies resort to an
IPO when managers are a priori of the good type whereas they remain private when managers
are a priori of the bad type. To sum up briefly these results, employers substitute one source of
information (stock prices) for the other (accounting profits).
More generally, the framework we adopt here allows for other sources of information. For
example, direct supervision can replace monitoring by the market as far as engineers working in
R&D departments are concerned. Then, the supervisor’s variable choice could be the number
of engineers he has under his control (assuming that more engineers render more diﬃcult the
assessment of their individual inputs).
1Of course, for the liquidity traders accepting to buy shares in the first place, the price they pay must take
into account the loss they make when they sell their shares to the speculator.
3
Of course, this work is by no mean the first to point out adverse eﬀects of business creation. In
particular, a number of research has emphasized that managers often expropriate their current
employer in the sense that they leave their companies with ideas or projects they developed
therein (Aghion and Tirole (1994), Rajan and Zingales (1997)). However, they consider other
mechanisms (promotions, trailer clauses) than the one we envision here. The present chapter
deeply builds on the career concerns literature. The starting point of this literature is that
managers are disciplined directly through the labor market: superior performances will generate
high wage oﬀers whereas poor performances will generate low wage oﬀers. In such a context,
explicit incentives may not be necessary (Fama (1980)). Holmstro¨m2 (1982, 1999) investigates
in details Fama’s idea that career concerns induce eﬃcient managerial behavior. He derives that
under some narrow assumptions: neutrality with respect to risk and no discounting rate, Fama’s
suggestion is correct. Nevertheless, if managers have time preferences, Holmstro¨m proves that
Fama’s conclusion does not hold. Hence, there exists a complementarity between explicit and
implicit incentives. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) show that career concerns still create important
incentives, even in the presence of explicit incentive contracts. Thus, the optimal compensation
contract optimizes total incentives, that is, the combination of the implicit incentives from career
concerns and the explicit incentives from compensation contracts. This optimal combination
varies with respect to several criteria. For example, explicit incentives should be stronger for
workers close to retirement, because they are less sensitive to implicit incentives (end of their
careers). The opposite applies for young managers, the current pay of whom should be separated
from current performance. In this chapter, we have chosen not to tackle the explicit incentives
issue. We do not mean to suggest that such incentives are irrelevant: employers actually use
them in formal compensation contracts (Murphy (1998), Gibbons and Murphy (1992)). However,
some constraints limit their utilization (regulated industries, Government agencies, diﬃculty to
verify the input of each employee, and so on). Hence, implicit incentives play a critical role and
we focus on this role here. The major- and crucial -point of departure of the present chapter vis
a` vis the above literature is that we endogenize the information that allows to update believes
regarding the managers’ talent. Indeed, this information depends both on the choice of managers
and of their employers. Thus, the career concerns we consider (i.e. the perspective of creating a
new firm) which usually serve as a disciplining device can trigger adverse managerial behaviors,
here. Finally, our research is closely connected to the papers of DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1995),
and Breeden and Viswanathan (1998). These authors examine financial hedging decisions by
managers motivated by career concerns. Our work is closely related to theirs in the sense that
hedging improves the information contained by corporate profits regarding management ability
since it eliminates extraneous noise. However, and contrary to us, DeMarzo and Duﬃe consider
risk averse managers and leave aside the information that is included in stock prices. Furthermore,
they do not allow for diﬀerent types of managers, which enables us to derive diﬀerent behaviors
depending on whether these managers are good or bad. Breeden and Viswanathan do consider
two diﬀerent types of agents, with unobservable hedging policy, but do not take into account the
possibility to create a firm.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the model and discusses the most
important assumptions. In Section 4.3, we determine both the equilibrium stock price and the
2For a general discussion on career concerns models, we shall refer the reader to Dewatripont, Jewitt and
Tirole (1999 part I), who develop a general model of career concerns with multiple tasks and multiple signals.
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conditions under which a manager can establish his own firm during the second period. Section
4.4 derives the optimal behaviors of both kinds of managers for both periods regarding their
choices of level of eﬀort and of risk. Concluding remarks follow. Proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a two-period model. In the second period good managers have the opportunity to
create their own businesses. In the first period all managers work within firms because they do
not possess enough cash to become entrepreneurs.
2.1 First period
There exists an infinity of firms and an infinity of employees so that the latter are paid their
marginal productivities. A firm’s accounting profit π1 (gross of the manager’s wage W ) is such
that
π1(e, θ, η, εi) = e+ θ + η + εi,
where e represents the eﬀort of the manager and θ represents his talent. Eﬀort is unobservable and
costs ψ(e) to the manager, with ψ(e) increasing and convex in e. Managerial talent is unknown
from both managers and their employers so that information is incomplete but symmetric. θ
is drawn from the distribution θ ∼ N(θ;σ2θ). Either θ = θ
sup
and managers are assumed to be
of the “good ”type or θ = θinf and managers are of the “bad” type (θ
sup
> θinf). We assume
η and εi to be two diﬀerent noises. The first one (with η ∼ N(0;σ2η)) represents the aggregate
risk of the market and is not under the control of the manager. Conversely, an adequate hedging
policy allows the manager to reduce the idiosyncratic risk εi (with i = 1, 2) of the project. To be
more specific, managers can choose between two versions of the project, Version 1 and Version 2.
Version 1 eliminates the idiosyncratic risk, i.e. ε1 = 0 with probability 1. However, hedging costs
c (ε1) = c. On the contrary, Version 2 does not provide hedging in the sense that ε2 ∼ N(0;σ2ε).
Thus, c (ε2) = 0. We assume the level of risk to be observable but not verifiable so that no
contract can be made contingent on it. This reflects that accounting standards do not impose on
those who run firms (i.e. managers) to disclose their hedging decisions. However, inside owners
have privileged information regarding these hedging decisions: they observe the choices managers
make but they are unable to write contracts contingent on this soft information3. Finally, θ and
η are independently distributed.
At the beginning of the first period, inside owners of companies can release a fraction τ of
the shares they own via an IPO. We adopt a framework a` la Kyle (1985). When companies are
publicly traded, two categories of outside investors hold stocks. Liquidity traders as a whole buy
equity (at the initial price P0) for investment purposes but will have to sell y shares (at price
P1)
4 when unobservable liquidity shocks occur. The number of shares y is normally distributed
3Biais and Casamatta (1999) also study the case of managers exerting eﬀort and choosing the risk of their
ventures. In their paper, both choices are unobservable, which diﬀers from our assumption that the choice of risk
is observable.
4Lemma 2 clarifies the computation of P1.
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with mean 0 and variance σ2y. A speculator can collect information about the future value of the
firm and earns money by trading on that information. The signal he privately observes is
s(e, θ, η,$j) = e+ θ + η +$j,
where $j (with j = 1, 2) represents the observation error. This error can be of two types. Either
the speculator chooses to receive a non-noisy signal, which requires an investigation eﬀort that
costs him c($1) = c
5. Then, $1 = 0 with probability 1. Or, he chooses to receive a less accurate
signal $2 ∼ N(0;σ2$2), which costs him zero. The market cannot observe the speculator’s choice
(nor the signal).
If insiders owners of companies decide to resort to an IPO, they strategically choose the
fraction of shares τ they release to outsiders. As will become apparent below, τ will aﬀect the
liquidity of the market. Hence, it will influence the speculator’s incentives to collect the accurate
signal. This will in turn impact the informational content of prices. However, inside owners can
opt to remain private.
Profits and prices are observable by everyone but, here, we assume that employers cannot use
them in a formal compensation contract. This is a shortcut to capture the idea that there exists
constraints which limit the use of explicit incentives (regulated industries, Government agencies,
diﬃculty to verify the input of each employee, and so on). Hence, implicit incentives are at the




at the end of the





corresponds to the first-period marginal productivity of the manager6. Hence, managers
exert eﬀort and choose a level of risk solely to influence their revenues tomorrow.
2.2 Second period
In the second period managers have the opportunity to create their own businesses in a new
industry provided that the updated believes regarding their types are suﬃciently good7. Let
E (θ | π1, P1, εi) represent these believes, updated by taking into account the information that
accrue at the end of the first period, i.e. the price of the stock and the profit. Establishing
a new firm requires a high up-front involvement from the potential entrepreneur (e.g. meeting
banks, lawyers, writing a business plan) before a project is actually undertaken. For simplicity,
we assume that the new venture can either succeed or fail as in Holmstro¨m-Tirole (1997). When
it succeeds, profits are equal to
π2(e,∆, θ, η, εi) = e+∆+ θ + η + εi,





= θ + e∗ − C, where θ corresponds to the managerial expected talent, e∗ represents the level of
managerial eﬀort at the equilibrium, and C represents the generic cost born by the firm. The latter corresponds
to the hedging cost as well as to the IPO cost, if any. See below for more details.
7At the end of the first period, inside owners of firms are aware of shocks realizations that have aﬀected their
results. Thus, they can infer the hedging policies of their competitors. Hence, second-period wages reflect the
updating of the believes taken into account that the level of risk is observable. We implicitly assume managers
can show to lenders their wages at the beginning of the second period so that lenders also update their believes.
As a short cut, we only say that the choice of risk is observable.
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where ∆ represents the additional productivity of the new industry. When the venture fails,
cash-flows are equal to zero. The neo-entrepreneur influences the probability of success of the
new firm: if his involvement is high the venture is crowned with success with certainty while if
his involvement is weak, the probability of success decreases to p (with p < 1). However, the
entrepreneur receives a non-monetary and non-transferable private benefit B in the latter case.
Undertaking a new venture also requires a financial investment I. We make the assumption-
which parallels Holmstro¨m and Tirole’s standard hypothesis (1997) -that talent let aside, a
project needs managerial involvement to be profitable. In other words,
e∗ − ψ(e∗) +∆− I > 0 > p [be∗ +∆]− ψ(be∗) +B − I,
where e∗ (respectively be∗) is the equilibrium level of eﬀort when the new entrepreneur is involved
(respectively not involved). For simplicity, investors are assumed to be competitive. All parties
are risk-neutral and protected by limited liability8.
So as to have the problem interesting, good (respectively bad) managers must be able (respec-
tively unable) to create their own firms if the market keeps the same believes about their abilities
tomorrow. Let eθ(.) denote the- endogenous -threshold above which a manager can establish his
own venture. Thus, we assume9
θ
sup ≥ eθ (W (θsup)) and θinf < eθ ¡W ¡θinf¢¢ .
The timing of events can be summarized as follows:
First period
1. At the beginning of the first period, all managers are hired by existing companies. They
agree on the fixed wages which are paid at the end of the first period. Simultaneously,
within each company, the controlling block of shareholders decides whether to undertake
an IPO or not. In the former case, it chooses the fraction τ of the capital they release to
liquidity traders at price P0.
2. Each manager chooses the level of risk εi of the project he undertakes. This choice is
observable but not contractible.
3. Then, each manager chooses his level of eﬀort e, which is not observable.
4. By incurring a cost c, the speculator can increase the precision $j of the private signal s
he receives regarding the profitability of the venture.
5. Then, liquidity traders face a liquidity shock and must sell y of their shares to the specu-
lator. Market observes net order flows. The stock price P1 is equal to the expected income
conditionally on the net order flow.
8Since entrepreneurs are protected by limited liability, “involving” them requires the design of an incentive
mechanism. Indeed, even if the project fails, which perfectly reveals that the entrepreneur was not involved
enough, the latter cannot be hanged or sent to jail.
9We will later come back to this assumption and examine the importance of the distance between the a priori
believes and the thresholds
³¯¯¯eθ ³W ³θsup´´− θsup ¯¯¯ and ¯¯¯eθ ¡W ¡θinf¢¢− θinf ¯¯¯´.
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